In identity-based encryption (IBE) systems, an efficient key delegation method to manage a large number of users and an efficient key revocation method to handle the dynamic credentials of users are needed. Revocable hierarchical IBE (RHIBE) can provide these two methods by organizing the identities of users as a hierarchy and broadcasting an update key for non-revoked users per each time period. To provide the key revocation functionality, previous RHIBE schemes use a tree-based revocation scheme. However, this approach has an inherent limitation such that the number of update key elements depends on the number of revoked users. In this paper, we propose two new RHIBE schemes in multilinear maps that use the public-key broadcast encryption scheme instead of using the tree-based revocation scheme to overcome the mentioned limitation. In our first RHIBE scheme, the number of private key elements and update key elements is reduced to O(ℓ) and O(ℓ) respectively where ℓ is the depth of a hierarchical identity. In our second RHIBE scheme, we can further reduce the number of private key elements from O(ℓ) to O(1).
Introduction
Let λ be a security parameter, ℓ be the maximum hierarchical level, N be the maximum number of users, and r be the number of revoked users. Sizes for public parameters (PP), private keys (SK), and update keys (UK) count group elements. BLM stands for bilinear maps and MLM stands for multilinear maps.
also secure in the selective revocation list model under the MDHE assumption. In this RHIBE scheme, the number of group elements in a private key, an update key, and a ciphertext is O (1) , O(ℓ) , and O(ℓ) respectively. Compared with our first RHIBE scheme that has O(ℓ) group elements in a private key, our second RHIBE scheme just has O(1) group elements in a private key. The detailed comparison of RHIBE schemes is given in Table 1 .
Our Techniques
To construct RHIBE schemes with shorter keys from multilinear maps, we basically follow the design technique of Park, Lee, and Lee [22] that uses the BGW-PKBE scheme [6] instead of the tree-based revocation system of Naor et al. [21] . However, the naive employment of this technique does not work since the delegation of private keys should be considered. To solve this problem, we devise new techniques for RHIBE in multilinear maps. We briefly review the RIBE scheme of Park, Lee, and Lee [22] and then overview our two-level RHIBE scheme for a simple exposition. If we simply follow the design strategy of Park et al. [22] , a trusted center which has a master key β ε , γ ε creates a private key for a 1-level identity ID 1 = (I 1 ) as SK ID 1 where d i is an index assigned to ID 1 and SI ε is the set of receiver indexes. Note that SK ID 1 is tied to the private key of PKBE and U K T,R ε is tied to the ciphertext header of PKBE. After that, the 1-level user of the identity ID 1 can delegate his private key to a 2-level user with an identity ID 2 = (I 1 , I 2 ) by creating a 2-level private key as SK ID 2 = {g } . If (I 1 ) ∈ R ε and (I 1 , I 2 ) ∈ R ID 1 , then the 2-level user of the identity ID 2 = (I 1 , I 2 ) can derive a decryption key DK ID 2 ,T = g 2 by performing paring operations.
However, there are some problems in the above approach. The first problem is that the 2-level user can extract the private key of the 1-level user from his private key since SK ID 1 is contained in SK ID 2 . The second problem is that the master key part g α N+1 (β ε +β ID 1 ) 1 of the decryption key DK ID 2 ,T is wrongly structured since a random value β ID 1 that is hidden to a sender is used. To overcome these problems, we devise a new random blinding technique for RHIBE that safely blinds a private key in delegation and cancels unnecessary random values in decryption. In this technique, the private key component g is included in the private key delegation process. This newly added element enables to cancel the random values r 0,2 and β ID 1 in the decryption key derivation process. Note that a 2-level user who is not revoked in R ID 1 only can derive a correct decryption key which has a master key g α N+1 β ε 2 by cancelling the random values. Furthermore, if we encode the identity of a user carefully, we can reduce the size of private key elements from O(ℓ 2 ) to O(ℓ) where ℓ is the hierarchical depth of the identity. Therefore, we can build an RHIBE scheme via the history-preserving updates [25] in which a private key and an update key include all private keys and update keys of lower level users from 3-leveled multilinear maps.
To achieve an RHIBE scheme with a constant number of private key elements, we apply the historyfree updates approach of Seo and Emura [27] . Let SK ID 1 be the 1-level private key for ID 1 , U K T,R ε be the 0-level update key, and DK ID 1 ,T be the 1-level decryption key as the same as our first RHIBE scheme. By following this approach, the 1-level user with an identity ID 1 = (I 1 ) simply creates a 2-level private key for ID 2 = (I 1 , I 2 ) as SK ID 2 = (g ). Next, he creates a 1-level update key U K T,R ID 1 by using his decryption key DK ID 1 ,T instead of using the 0-level update key U K T,R ε . In this step, we use the random blinding technique to prevent a collusion attack. That is, the decryption key component g α N+1 β ε 2 F 2,1 (I 1 ) −r 1,1 H 2 (T ) r 0 is safely blinded by a random element g
. Then, the 1-level update key
1 } . Note that this random blinding element is removed in the decryption key derivation process. Therefore, we have an RHIBE scheme with shorter private keys.
Related Work
The concept of IBE was introduced by Shamir to solve the certificate management problem in PKE [28] . After the first realization of an IBE scheme in bilinear maps by Boneh and Franklin [5] , many IBE schemes in bilinear maps were proposed [3, 12, 29, 30] . As mentioned before, providing an efficient revocation mechanism for IBE is a very important issue. Boneh and Franklin introduced a simple revocation method for IBE by concatenating an identity ID with time T [5] . However, this method is not scalable since a trusted center periodically generates a private key for each user on each time period. The first scalable RIBE scheme was proposed by Boldyreva, Goyal, and Kumar [2] by combining the Fuzzy IBE scheme of Sahai and Waters [24] and the complete subtree (CS) scheme of Naor et al. [21] . Many other RIBE schemes also followed this design technique [20, 26] . A different RIBE scheme that uses the subset difference (SD) scheme instead of using the CS scheme proposed by Lee et al. [16] . Recently, Park, Lee, and Lee proposed a new RIBE scheme from multilinear maps that has a constant number of private key elements and update key elements [22] .
As mentioned before, the notion of IBE can be extended to HIBE where a trusted center can delegate the generation of private keys to other users. After the introduction of HIBE [15] , many HIBE scheme with different properties were proposed [3, 4, 8, 13, 14, 17, 19, 30] . The first RHIBE scheme was presented by Seo and Emura [25] that combines the BB-HIBE scheme and the CS scheme. To reduce the size of private keys in the first RHIBE scheme, Seo and Emura proposed another RHIBE scheme via history-free update method that combines the BBG-HIBE scheme and the CS (or SD) scheme [27] . In previous RHIBE schemes, the maximum hierarchy depth should be fixed in the setup phase. To overcome this limitation, Ryu et al. proposed an unbounded RHIBE scheme by using an unbounded HIBE scheme [23] . Recently, Lee and Park proposed an RHIBE scheme with shorter private keys and update keys [18] . To reduce the size of private keys and update keys, they first presented a new HIBE scheme that supports a short intermediate private key and build an RHIBE scheme in a modular way.
Preliminaries
In this section, we review multilinear maps and complexity assumptions in multilinear maps.
Notation
Let λ be a security parameter and [n] be the set {1, . . . , n} for n ∈ Z. Let I be the identity space. A hierarchical identity ID with a depth k is defined as an identity vector ID = (I 1 , . . . , I k ) ∈ I k . We let ID| j be a vector (I 1 , . . . , I j ) of size j derived from ID. If ID = (I 1 , . . . , I k ), then we have ID = ID| k . We define ID| 0 = ε for simplicity. A function Prefix(ID| k ) returns a set of prefix vectors {ID| j } where 1 ≤ j ≤ k where ID| k = (I 1 , . . . , I k ) ∈ I k for some k. For two hierarchical identities ID| i and ID| j with i < j, ID| i is an ancestor identity of ID| j and ID| j is a descendant identity of ID| i if ID| i ∈ Prefix(ID| j ).
Leveled Multilinear Maps
We define generic leveled multilinear maps that are the leveled version of the cryptographic multilinear maps introduced by Boneh and Silverberg [7] . We follow the definition of Garg, Gentry, and Halevi [11] . Definition 2.1 (Leveled Multilinear Maps). We assume the existence of a group generator G, which takes as input a security parameter λ and a positive integer k. Let G = (G 1 , . . . , G k ) be a sequence of groups of large prime order p > 2 λ . In addition, we let g i be a canonical generator of G i respectively. We assume the existence of a set of bilinear maps {e i, j : G i × G j → G i+ j |i, j ≥ 1; i + j ≤ k} that have the following properties:
• Bilinearity: The map e i, j satisfies the following relation:
• Non-degeneracy: We have that e i, j (g i , g j ) = g i+ j for each valid i, j.
We say that G is a multilinear group if the group operations in G as well as all bilinear maps are efficiently computable. We often omit the subscripts of e i, j and just write e.
Complexity Assumptions
We introduce complexity assumptions in multilinear maps. This assumption is the multilinear version of the Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Exponent (BDHE) assumption of Boneh, Gentry, and Waters [6] .
be the description of a k-leveled multilinear group of order p. Let g i be a generator of G i . The decisional (k, N)-MDHE assumption is that if the challenge tuple
from a random element Z = Z 1 ∈ G k with more than a negligible advantage. The advantage of A is defined as Adv 
Revocable HIBE with History-Preserving Updates
In this section, we first define the syntax and the security of RHIBE. Next, we propose an RHIBE scheme with history-preserving updates from three-leveled multilinear maps and prove its selective security.
Definition
Revocable HIBE (RHIBE) is an extension of IBE that provides both the delegation of private keys and the revocation of private keys [25] . In RHIBE, a user who has a private key SK ID for a hierarchical identity ID = (I 1 , . . . , I ℓ−1 ) can generate a (long-term) private key SK ID ′ for a child user with the identity ID ′ = (I 1 , . . . , I ℓ ) where ID ∈ Prefix(ID ′ ). The user with ID also periodically broadcasts an update key U K T,R ID for the set R ID of revoked child users at a time period T . If the child user with ID ′ who has a private key SK ID ′ is not included in the revoked set R ID , then he can derive a (short-term) decryption key DK ID ′ ,T from SK ID ′ and U K T,R ID ′ . A sender creates a ciphertext CT ID ′ ,T that encrypts a message M for a receiver identity ID ′ and a time period T , and then the receiver who has a decryption key DK ID ′ ,T can obtain the message by decrypting the ciphertext CT ID ′ ,T . The syntax of RHIBE is defined as follows: Definition 3.1 (Revocable HIBE). A revocable HIBE (RHIBE) scheme that is associated with the identity space I, the time space T , and the message space M, consists of seven algorithms Setup, GenKey, UpdateKey, DeriveKey, Encrypt, Decrypt, and Revoke, which are defined as follows:
The setup algorithm takes as input a security parameter 1 λ , the maximum number N of users in each depth, and the maximum depth L of the identity. It outputs a master key MK, a revocation list RL ε , a state ST ε , and public parameters PP. 
GenKey(ID|
•
=⊥ with all but negligible probability.
The security model of RHIBE with history-preserving updates was defined by Seo and Emura [25] . For the security proof our RHIBE scheme, we define a selective revocation list model where an adversary initially submits the set of revoked identities. This weaker model was introduced by Boldyreva, et al. [2] and used in other schemes [16, 22, 27] . In this paper, we follow the selective revocation list model refined by Seo and Emura [27] . In this security model of RHIBE, an adversary initially submits a challenge identity ID * | ℓ * , challenge time T * , and a revoked identity set R * at the time T * . After receiving public parameters PP, the adversary can adaptively request private keys, update keys, decryption keys, and revocations with some restrictions. In the challenge step, the adversary submits challenge messages M * 0 , M * 1 and the challenger creates a challenge ciphertext CT * that encrypts one of the challenge messages. The adversary continually requests private keys, update keys, and decryption keys. Finally, if the adversary correctly guesses the encrypted message, then he wins the game. The details of the security model is described as follows: Definition 3.2 (Selective Revocation List Security, SRL-IND). The SRL-IND security of RHIBE is defined in terms of the following experiment between a challenger C and a PPT adversary A:
1. Init: A initially submits a challenge identity ID * | ℓ * ∈ I ℓ * , challenge time T * ∈ T , and a revoked identity set R * ⊆ I ℓ at the time T * .
2. Setup: C generates a master key MK, a revocation list RL ε , a state ST ε , and public parameters PP by running Setup(1 λ , N, L). It keeps MK, RL ε , ST ε to itself and gives PP to A.
Phase 1:
A adaptively requests a polynomial number of queries. These queries are processed as follows: 
Phase 2:
A may continue to request a polynomial number of private keys, update keys, and decryption keys subject to the same restrictions as before. The advantage of A is defined as Adv
where the probability is taken over all the randomness of the experiment. An RHIBE scheme is SRL-IND secure if for all PPT adversary A, the advantage of A in the above experiment is negligible in the security parameter λ .
Building Blocks
Let I = {0, 1} l 1 be the identity space and T = {0, 1} l 2 be the time space where l 1 = 2λ and l 2 = λ for a security parameter λ . Let ID = (I 1 , . . . , I k ) be an hierarchical identity. We define EncodeCID(ID) as a function that takes as input ID = (I 1 , . . . , I k ) and outputs a concatenated identity CID = (CI 1 , . . . ,CI k ) where CI j = H(I 1 · · · I j ), denotes the concatenation of two strings, and H is a collision-resistant hash function. This encoding function has an interesting property such that if ID ∈ Prefix(ID ′ ) then CI k = CI ′ i for all i ∈ [k] except with negligible probability [18] .
We describe a modified HIBE scheme of Boneh and Boyen [3] that additionally takes a time period in multilinear groups. Note that we define the key-encapsulation mechanism (KEM) version of HIBE.
HIBE.Setup(GDS
be the description of a multilinear group and L be the maximum depth of the hierarchical identity.
It first selects random elements
and h 2 can be obtained from { f 1,i } 1≤i≤L and h 1 by performing pairing operations.
where CI[ j] is a bit value at the position j and T [ j] is a bit value at the position j.
3. It selects a random exponent α ∈ Z p and outputs a master key MK = α and public parameters
HIBE.GenKey(ID| ℓ , T, MK, PP):
It selects random exponents r 1 , . . . , r ℓ , r L+1 ∈ Z p and outputs a private key
HIBE.RandKey(SK
It selects random exponents r 1 , . . . , r ℓ , r L+1 ∈ Z p and outputs a randomized private key
It selects random a exponent r ℓ ∈ Z p and creates a tem- 
and a session key EK = Λ s .
HIBE.Decrypt(CH
Let N = {1, . . . , N} where N is the (polynomial) number of users. We describe the PKBE scheme of Boneh, Gentry, and Waters [6] .
PKBE.Setup(GDS
and N be the maximum number of users. It selects random exponents α, γ ∈ Z p and outputs a master key MK = (α, γ), an element Y = g γ 1 , and public parameters
.
PKBE.GenKey(d, MK, PP):
Let d ∈ N be an index and MK = (α, γ). It outputs a private key
PKBE.Encrypt(S, β ,Y, PP):
Let S be a set of receiver indexes, β be a random exponent in Z p , and Y = g γ 1 be a group element in G 1 . It outputs a ciphertext header
and a session key EK = Γ β . 
PKBE.Decrypt(CH
S , SK d , PP): Let CH S = (E 0 , E 1 ) and SK d = K. If d ∈ S, then it outputs the session key EK by computing e(X d , E 1 ) · e(E 0 , K · ∏ j∈S, j =d X N+1− j+d ) −1 . Otherwise, it outputs ⊥.
Construction
By using the HIBE and PKBE schemes that are described in the previous section, we can build an RHIBE scheme. Our RHIBE scheme with history-preserving updates in multilinear maps is described as follows:
Let N be the maximum number users in each depth and L be the maximum depth of the hierarchical identity. 3. It selects a random exponent β ε ∈ Z p and saves (β ε , γ ε ) to ST ε where β ε = β ID 0 and γ ε = γ ID 0 = γ. It outputs a master key MK = α, an empty revocation list RL ε , a state ST ε , and public parameters
It first generates a multilinear group
RHIBE.GenKey(ID|
where
2. If ℓ ≥ 2, then it selects a random exponent r ℓ−1,2 ∈ Z p and creates an updated level private key
can be retrieved from PP and g
can be retrieved from LSK ℓ−2 or PP.
3. It assigns a unique index d ℓ ∈ N to the identity ID| ℓ and adds a tuple
Next, it selects a random exponent r ℓ,1 ∈ Z p and creates a level private key
4. Finally, it outputs a private key
RHIBE.UpdateKey(T, RL ID|
, PP BE ). It selects a random exponent r ℓ−1 ∈ Z p and creates a level update key
Finally, it outputs an update key U K T,R ID|
, SI ID| ℓ−1 , LU K ℓ−1 .
RHIBE.DeriveKey(SK
it outputs ⊥ since the identity ID| ℓ is revoked. Otherwise, it proceeds as follows:
2 )} and computes the following components
Next, it derives a temporal decryption key
3. Finally, it outputs a decryption key DK ID| ℓ ,T by running HIBE.RandKey(T DK ID| ℓ ,T , PP HIBE ). 
RHIBE.Encrypt(ID|

RHIBE.Decrypt(CT
ID| ℓ ,T , DK ID ′ | ℓ ,T ′ , PP): Let CT ID| ℓ ,T = (C,CH HIBE ). If (ID| ℓ = ID ′ | ℓ ) ∧ (T = T ′ ),
Correctness
) be an update key for time T and a revoked set R ID| ℓ−1 . If ID| ℓ ∈ R ID| ℓ−1 , then we obtain the following equations
from the correctness of the PKBE scheme. The decryption key derivation algorithm correctly derives a temporal decryption key as
Note that the temporal decryption key is the same as the private key of the above HIBE scheme.
Security Analysis
We first prove the security of the modified HIBE scheme. Note that the selective KEM security model of the modified HIBE scheme can be easily derived from the original selective KEM security model of HIBE by simply incorporating a time period T in private keys and the challenge ciphertext. We omit the description of the security model. or Z = Z 1 ∈ G 3 . Then B that interacts with A is described as follows:
Init: A initially submits a challenge identity ID * | ℓ * = (I * 1 , . . . , I * ℓ * ) and challenge time T * . It obtains CID * | ℓ * = (CI * 1 , . . . ,CI * ℓ * ) by calling EncodeCID(ID * | ℓ * ).
Setup: B first chooses random exponents
It implicitly sets α = a N+1 b and publishes the public parameters PP as
For notational simplicity, we define
We have ∆CI i ≡ 0 mod p except with negligible probability if CI i = CI * i since there exists at least one index
and { f ′ i, j,k } are randomly chosen. We also have ∆T ≡ 0 mod p except with negligible probability if T = T * .
Phase 1:
A adaptively requests a polynomial number of private key queries. If this is a private key query for a hierarchical identity ID| ℓ = (I 1 , . . . , I ℓ ) and a time period T , then B obtains CID| ℓ = (CI 1 , . . . ,CI ℓ ) by calling EncodeCID(ID| ℓ ) and proceeds as follows.
• Case ID ℓ ∈ Prefix(ID * | ℓ * ): In this case, we have CI ℓ = CI * i for all i by the property of the encoding function [18] . It selects random exponents r 1 , . . . , r ℓ−1 , r ′ ℓ , r L+1 ∈ Z p and creates a private key SK ID ℓ ,T by implicitly setting r ℓ = (−a/∆CI ℓ + r ′ ℓ )b as
2 .
• Case ID| ℓ = ID * | ℓ * : In this case, we have T = T * . It selects random exponents r 1 , . . . , r ℓ , r ′ L+1 ∈ Z p and creates a private key SK ID ℓ ,T by implicitly setting r L+1 = (−a/∆T + r ′ L+1 )a N as
Challenge: B creates the challenge ciphertext header CH * by implicitly setting s = c as
h ′ 0 and the challenge session key EK * = Z. Phase 2: Same as Phase 1. Guess: Finally, A outputs a guess µ ′ ∈ {0, 1}. B also outputs µ ′ .
Theorem 3.3. The above RHIBE scheme is SRL-IND secure if the (3, N)-MDHE assumption holds where N is the maximum number of child users in the system.
Proof. Suppose there exists an adversary A that attacks the above RHIBE scheme with a non-negligible advantage. A meta-simulator B that solves the MDHE assumption using A is given: a challenge tuple 
and publishes the public parameters PP as 
Phase 1:
A adaptively requests a polynomial number of private key, update key, and decryption key queries. If this is a private key query for an identity ID| ℓ = (I 1 , . . . , I ℓ ), then B proceeds as follows: Note that
• 
, PP).
• Case ID| ℓ−1 ∈ Prefix(ID * | ℓ * ): Note that ID 0 = ID ℓ−1 is included in this case. We have ID ℓ = (I * 1 , . . . , and selects random exponents r 1,1 , . . . , r x−1,1 ,r 1,2 , . . . ,r x−1,2 ∈ Z p and creates level private keys by implicitly setting {r i,2 =r i,2 − a N+1 } 1≤i<x as r x+1,1 , . . . , r ℓ−1,1 , r x+1,2 , . . . , r ℓ−1,2 ∈ Z p and creates level private keys as
If i = ℓ, the simulator can use the partitioning technique of Boneh et al. [6] . It recalls a random exponent γ ID * i−1
and obtains SK BE = K BE by requesting an PKBE private key query for
). Next, it selects a random exponent r i,1 ∈ Z p and creates a level private key as and selects random exponents r 1,1 , . . . , r ℓ−1,1 ,r 1,2 , . . . ,r ℓ−1,2 ∈ Z p and creates level private keys by implicitly setting
If i = ℓ, the simulator can use the partitioning technique of Boneh and Boyen [3] . We have I i = I * i from the restriction of Definition 3.2. It selects a random exponent r ′ i,1 ∈ Z p and creates a level private key by implicitly setting r i,1 = −a/∆I i + r ′ i,1 as
1 ,
If this is an update key query for an identity ID| ℓ−1 = (I 1 , . . . , I ℓ−1 ) and a time period T , then B defines a revoked identity set R ID ℓ−1 at the time T from RL ID ℓ−1 and proceeds as follows: } x≤i≤ℓ−1 .
• Case T = T * : It first sets a revoked index set RI ID ℓ−1 of R ID ℓ−1 by using ST ID ℓ−1 . It also sets 
and selects a random exponent r x+1 , . . . , r y ∈ Z p . It creates a level update key as 
If 0 ≤ i ≤ x, the simulator can use the partitioning technique of Boneh et al. [6] . It recalls random
and selects a random exponent r 0 , . . . , r x ∈ Z p . It creates level update keys as 
If y < i ≤ ℓ − 1, the simulator can normally generate level private keys. It selects random exponents r y+1 , . . . , r ℓ−1 , γ ID y+1 , . . . , γ ID ℓ−1 , β ID y+1 , . . . , β ID ℓ−1 ∈ Z p and creates level private keys as
If this is a decryption key query for an identity ID = (I 1 , . . . , I ℓ ) and a time period T , then B proceeds as follows: It requests an HIBE private key for ID and T to B HIBE and receives SK HIBE,ID,T . Next, it sets the decryption key DK ID,T = SK HIBE,ID,T . Challenge: A submits two challenge messages M * 0 , M * 1 . B chooses a random bit δ ∈ {0, 1} and proceed as follows: It requests the challenge ciphertext for ID * and T * to B HIBE and receives CH HIBE,ID * ,T * . Next, it sets the challenge ciphertext To finish the proof, we first show that the distribution of the simulation is correct from Lemma 3.4. This completes our proof. 
In case of ID ℓ / ∈ R * ID * ℓ−1
and ID ℓ−1 ∈ Prefix(ID * ℓ * ), we have that the private key is correctly distributed from the setting {r i, 2 
a N+1− j } 0≤i<ℓ as the following equation
Next, we show that the distribution of update keys is correct. In case of T = T * , we have that the update key is correctly distributed from the setting
a N+1− j } 1≤i≤y as the following equation
In case of T = T * , we have that the update key is correctly distributed from the setting {β
a N+1− j } 0≤i≤y as the following equation
Finally, we show that the distribution of the challenge ciphertext is correct. If Z = Z 0 = g a N+1 bc 3 is given, then the challenge ciphertext is correctly distributed as the following equation
Otherwise, the component C of the challenge ciphertext is independent of δ in the A's view since Z 1 is a random element in G 3 . This completes our proof.
Revocable HIBE with History-Free Updates
In this section, we first define the syntax and the security model of RHIBE with history-free updates. Next, we propose another RHIBE scheme with short private key and prove its security.
Definition
Definition 4.1 (Revocable HIBE: History-Free Update). A revocable HIBE (RHIBE) scheme that is associated with the identity space I, the time space T , and the message space M, consists of seven algorithms Setup, GenKey, UpdateKey, DeriveKey, Encrypt, Decrypt, and Revoke, which are defined as follows:
GenKey(ID|
Finally, it outputs an update key U K T,R ID|
ℓ−1 = PDK ℓ−1 , {SI ID| ℓ−1 , LU K ℓ−1 } .
RHIBE.DeriveKey(SK
, then it outputs ⊥ since the identity ID ℓ is revoked. Otherwise, it proceeds the following steps:
and computes the following components
2. Next, it derives a temporal decryption key
RHIBE.Encrypt(ID| ℓ , T, M, PP):
Let ID| ℓ = (I 1 ,
RHIBE.Decrypt(CT ID,T , DK ID
′ ,T ′ , PP): Let CT ID,T = (C,CH HIBE ). If (ID = ID ′ ) ∧ (T = T ′ ),
Correctness
Let SK ID ℓ be a private key for an identity ID ℓ that is associated with an index d ID ℓ−1 , and U K T,R ID ℓ−1 be an update key for a time T and a revoked identity set R ID ℓ−1 . We have
If ID ℓ / ∈ R ID ℓ−1 , then the decryption key derivation algorithm first correctly derives temporal decryption key as
Security Analysis
To prove the security of our RHIBE scheme via history-free approach, we carefully combine the partitioning methods of the BGW-PKBE scheme [6] , the BB-HIBE scheme [3] , and our cancelation technique. Proof. Suppose there exists an adversary A that attacks the above RHIBE scheme with a non-negligible advantage. A meta-simulator B that solves the MDHE assumption using A is given: a challenge tuple
, . . . , g a 2N 1 , g b 1 for the BDHE assumption can be derived from the challenge tuple D of the MDHE assumption. Let B HIBE be the simulator in the security proof of Theorem 3.2 and B PKBE be a simulator in security proof of Theorem 3.1. Then B that interacts with A is described as follows:
Init: A initially submits a challenge identity ID * ℓ * = (I * 1 , . . . , I * ℓ * ), a challenge time T * , and a revoked identity set R * = (R * 
Phase 1:
A adaptively requests a polynomial number of private key, update key, and decryption key queries. If this is a private key query for an identity ID ℓ = (I 1 , . . . , I ℓ ), then B proceeds as follows: Note that SK ID ℓ = ({d ℓ , LSK ℓ }) where LSK ℓ = (K ℓ,0 , K ℓ,1 ).
• Case ID ℓ−1 / ∈ Prefix(ID * ℓ : In this case, the simulator can use the partitioning method of Boenh et al. [6] . Next, it selects a random exponent r ℓ ∈ Z p and creates a private key SK ID ℓ as 
-Case ID ℓ−1 ∈ Prefix(ID * ℓ * ) : In this case, the simulator can use the partitioning method of Boneh and Boyen [3] to create a level update key, and the cancelation technique by using the session key of PKBE to create a partial decryption key. It selects a random exponent Otherwise, the component C of the challenge ciphertext is independent of δ in the A's view since Z 1 is a random element in G 3 . This completes our proof.
Conclusion
In this paper, we first proposed an RHIBE scheme via history-preserving updates with O(ℓ) number of private key elements and update key elements by combining the BB-HIBE scheme and the BGW-PKBE scheme. Next, we proposed another RHIBE scheme via history-free updates that reduces the number of private key elements from O(ℓ) to O (1) . An interesting open problem is to build an adaptive secure RHIBE scheme with O(ℓ) number of private key elements and update key elements. Another one is to construct an RHIBE scheme with O(ℓ) number of private key elements and update key elements that can handle exponential number of users in the system.
